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Abstract. We show that there is a mathematical obstruction to complete Turing computability
of intelligence. This obstruction can be circumvented only if human reasoning is fundamentally
unsound. The most compelling original argument for existence of such an obstruction was proposed
by Penrose, however Gödel, Turing and Lucas have also proposed such arguments. We first partially
reformulate the argument of Penrose. In this formulation we argue that his argument works up to
possibility of construction of a certain Gödel statement. We then completely re-frame the argument
in the language of Turing machines, and by partially defining our subject just enough, we show that
a certain analogue of a Gödel statement, or a Gödel string as we call it in the language of Turing
machines, can be readily constructed directly, without appeal to the Gödel incompleteness theorem,
and thus removing the final objection.
Question 1. Can human intelligence be completely modelled by a Turing machine?
An informal definition of a Turing machine (see [1]) is as follows: it is an abstract machine which
permits certain inputs, and produces outputs. The outputs are determined from the inputs by a fixed
finite algorithm, in a specific sense. In particular anything that can be computed by computers as we
know them can be computed by a Turing machine. For the purpose of the main result the reader may
simply understand a Turing machine as a digital computer with unbounded memory running a certain
program. Unbounded memory is just mathematical convenience, it can in specific arguments, also of
the kind we make, be replaced by non-explicitly bounded memory.
Turing himself has started on a form of Question 1 in his “Computing machines and Intelligence”,
[2], where he also informally outlined a possible obstruction to a yes answer coming from Gödel’s in-
completeness theorem. For the incompleteness theorem to come in we need some assumption on the
fundamental soundness or consistency of human reasoning. We need some qualifier like “fundamental”
as even mathematicians are not on the surface sound at all times. Here this “fundamental” is under-
stood as follows. We are on the surface unsound not because of fundamental internal inconsistencies of
our mental constructions, but for the following pair of reasons. First, due to time constraints humans
make certain leaps of faith without fully vetting their logic. Second, the physically noisy, faulty, bio-
logical nature of our brain leads to interpretation errors of our mental constructions. By “faulty” we
mean the possibly common occurrence of faults in brain processes, coming from things like brain cell
death, signaling noise between neurons, neurotransmitter imbalance, etc. Let us call all these possible
fault vectors “brain noise”. In other words, according to us to say that a human being is fundamen-
tally sound, is to say that after “stripping out” the “brain noise” this human being will be sound and
have undiminished reasoning powers.
Gödel first argued for a no answer to Question 1 in [10, 310], relating the question to existence
of absolutely undecidable problems, see Feferman [5] for a discussion. Since existence of absolutely
undecidable problems is such a difficult and contentious issue, even if Gödel’s argument is in essence
correct it is not completely compelling.
Later Lucas [9] and later again and more robustly Penrose [15] argued for a no answer, based only
on soundness. Such an argument if correct would be extremely compelling. They further formalized
and elaborated the obstruction coming from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. And they reject the
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possibility that humans could be unsound on a fundamental level, as does Gödel but for him it is
apparently not even a possibility, it does not seem to be stated in [10]. 1
It should also be noted that for Penrose in particular, non-computability of intelligence is evidence
for new physics, and he has specific and very intriguing proposals with Hameroff [8], on how this can
take place in the human brain. Here is a partial list of some partially related work on mathematical
models of brain activity and or quantum collapse models: [11], [14], [6], [7].
The following is a slightly informal version of our main Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 0.1. Either there are cognitively meaningful, non Turing computable processes in the human
brain, or human beings are fundamentally unsound. This theorem is indeed a mathematical fact, given
our chosen interpretation of fundamental soundness of human reasoning as outlined above.
The immediate implications and context of the above are in mathematical physics and in part biol-
ogy, and philosophy. For even existence of non Turing computable processes in nature is not known.
For example we expect beyond reasonable doubt that solutions of fluid flow or N -body problems are
generally non Turing computable, (over Z, if not over R cf. [3]), as modeled in essentially classical
mechanics. But in a more physically accurate and fundamental model they may both become com-
putable, (possibly if the nature of the universe is ultimately discreet.) Our theorem says that either
there are absolutely, that is model independent, non-computable processes in physical nature, in fact
in the functioning of the brain, or human beings are fundamentally unsound, which is a mathematical
condition on the functioning of the human brain. Despite the partly physical context the technical
methods of the paper are mainly of mathematics and computer science, as we need very few physical
assumptions.
Outline of the main idea of the Gödelian analysis. What follows will be very close in essence
to the argument Penrose gives in [16], which we take to be his main and final argument. However
we partially reinterpret this to be closer to our argument later on. While this outline uses some of
the language of formal systems, we will not use this language in our main argument, which is based
purely on the language of Turing machines, and is much more elementary, in particular any gaps of
the following outline should disappear.
Let P be a human subject, which we understand at the moment as a machine printing statements
in arithmetic, given some input. That is for each Σ some string input in a fixed finite alphabet, P (Σ)
is a statement in arithmetic, e.g. “There are infinitely many primes.” Say now P is in contact with
experimenter/operator E. The input strings that E gives P are pairs (ΣT , n) for ΣT specification of
a Turing machines T , and n ∈ N.
Let ΘT be the statement:
(0.2) T computes P.
For each (ΣT , n), P prints his statement P (ΣT , n), which he asserts to hold if ΘT . We ask that for
each fixed T : {P (ΣT , n)}n is the complete list of statements that P asserts to be true conditionally
on ΘT . Finally, we put the condition on our P that he asserts himself to be fundamentally consistent.
More specifically, P asserts for each T the statement IT :
(0.3) ΘT =⇒ T is consistent.
By T being consistent we mean here:
T (ΣT , n) 6= ¬(T (ΣT ,m)),
for any n,m with ¬ the logical negation of the statement, and where inequality is just string inequality
of the corresponding sentences. As a side remark, asserting ones own consistency is by no means
contentious, as most people assert their consistency in some form by implication. For if a human H
asserts 0 6= 1 in absolute faith, that is H asserts that they will never assert 0 = 1, while “sane”, then
1It is likely most mathematicians would sympathize with Gödel, after all the entirety mathematics is meaningless if
mathematicians are fundamentally unsound.
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by implication H asserts their consistency. For if H is not consistent (but accepts first order logic)
they must eventually assert everything, while “sane”, in particular 0 = 1.
Let then T0 be a specified Turing machine, and suppose that E passes to P input of the form
(ΣT0 , n). Now, as is well known
2, the statements {T0(ΣT0 , n)}n must be the complete list of provable
statements in a certain formal system F(T0) explicitly constructible given T0. And F(T0) would be
consistent if ΘT0 and if IT0 . In particular if ΘT0 and if IT0 , then there would be a true (in the standard
model of arithmetic) Gödel statement G(T0) such that T0(ΣT0 , n) 6= G(T0), for all n.
But P asserts IT0 , hence he must assert by implication that
ΘT0 =⇒ G(T0).
And so if P knew how to construct G(T0) then this statement must be in the list {P (ΣT0 , n)}n, and so
in the list {T0(ΣT0 , n)}n, so we would get a contradiction. So either not ΘT0 , that is P is not computed
by T0 or P is not consistent, but T0 is arbitrary so we obtain an obstruction to computability of P .
The above outline would at least in principle work if G(T0) was constructible by P . From this
author’s point of view constructibility of G(T0) is not in principle an issue. This is because the
specification of F(T0) could be explicitly obtained by P , given the finite specification of T0. And
the Gödel statement could always, at least in principle, be explicitly constructed once one knows the
formal system, even if in practice this may be hopelessly difficult. We will delve no further into this.
One detailed critique of the Penrose argument is given in Koellner [12], [13], see also Penrose [17], and
Chalmers [4] for discussions on related issues. (Note of course that our argument above is significantly
different.)
In this note we completely solve the above problem of explicit construction of the Gödel statement.
We reformulate the above idea using a more elementary approach, more heavily based in Turing
machines. To this end, we partially define our subject henceforth denoted by S, by means of formalizing
properties of a certain function associated to S. We do this so that a certain analogue of the Gödel
statement can be readily constructed directly, avoiding intricacies of formal systems and the general
incompleteness theorem. This will not be exactly “Gödel statement”, but rather a “Gödel string” as
we call it, because we will not even be dealing with formal systems, but purely with Turing machines.
But this string has analogous properties.
As a final remark, technically the paper is mostly elementary and should be widely readable in
entirety.
1. Some preliminaries
This section can be just skimmed on a first reading. Really what we are interested in is not Turing
machines per se, but computations that can be simulated by Turing machine computations. These
can for example be computations that a mathematician performs with paper and pencil, and indeed
is the original motivation for Turing’s specific model. However to introduce Turing computations we
need Turing machines, here is our version which is a computationally equivalent, minor variation of
Turing’s original machine.
Definition 1.1. A Turing machine M consists of:
• Three infinite (1-dimensional) tapes Ti, To, Tc, (input, output and computation) divided into
discreet cells, next to each other. Each cell contains a symbol from some finite alphabet. A
special symbol b for blank, (the only symbol which may appear infinitely many often).
• Three heads Hi,Ho,Hc (pointing devices), Hi can read each cell in Ti to which it points, Ho,Hc
can read/write each cell in To, Tc to which they point. The heads can then move left or right
on the tape.
• A set of internal states Q, among these is “start” state q0. And a non-empty set F ⊂ Q of
final, “finish” states.
2I don’t know a standard reference but see for example [5].
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• Input string Σ: the collection of symbols on the tape Ti, so that to the left and right of Σ there
are only symbols b. We assume that in state q0 Hi points to the beginning of the input string,
and that the Tc, To have only b symbols.
• A finite set of instructions I that given the state q the machine is in currently, and given the
symbols the heads are pointing to, tells M to do the following, the taken actions 1-3 below will
be (jointly) called an executed instruction set, or just step:
(1) Replace symbols with another symbol in the cells to which the heads Hc,Ho point (or leave
them).
(2) Move each head Hi,Hc,Ho left, right, or leave it in place, (independently).
(3) Change state q to another state or keep it.
• Output string Σout, the collection of symbols on the tape To, so that to the left and right of
Σout there are only symbols b, when the machine state is final. When the internal state is one
of the final states we ask that the instructions are to do nothing, so that these are frozen states.
We also have the following minor variations on standard definitions, and notation.
Definition 1.2. A complete configuration of a Turing machine M or total state is the collection
of all current symbols on the tapes, position of the heads, and current internal state. A Turing
computation, or computation sequence for M is a possibly not eventually constant sequence
∗M(Σ) := {si}i=∞i=0
of total states of M , determined by the input Σ and M , with s0 the initial configuration whose internal
state is q0, si+1 is the total state that results from executing the instructions set of M on the total
state si. If elements of {si}i=∞i=0 are eventually in some final machine state, so that the sequence is
eventually constant, then we say that the computation halts. In this case we denote by sf the final
configuration, so that the sequence is eventually constant with terms sf . We define the length of a
computation sequence to be the first occurrence of n > 0 s.t. sn = sf . For a given Turing computation
∗M(Σ), we shall write
∗M(Σ)→ x,
if ∗M(Σ) halts and x is the output string.
We write M(Σ) for the output string of M , given the input string Σ, if the associated Turing
computation ∗M(Σ) halts.
Definition 1.3. Let Strings denote the set of all finite strings, including the empty string ∅, of
symbols in some fixed finite alphabet, for example {0, 1}. Given a partially defined function f :
Strings → Strings, that is a function defined on some subset of Strings - we say that a Turing
machine M computes f if ∗M(Σ)→ f(Σ), whenever f(Σ) is defined.
We may just call a partially defined function f : Strings → Strings as a function, for simplicity.
So a Turing machine T itself determines a function, which is defined on all Σ ∈ Strings s.t. ∗T (Σ)
halts, by Σ 7→ T (Σ). The following definition is purely for writing purposes.
Definition 1.4. Given Turing computations (for possibly distinct Turing machines) ∗T1(Σ1), ∗T2(Σ2)
we say that they are equivalent if they both halt with the same output string or both do not halt. We
write T1(Σ1) = T2(Σ2) if ∗T1(Σ1), ∗T2(Σ2) both halt with the same value.
In practice we will allow our Turing machine T to reject some elements of Strings as valid input.
We may formalize this by asking that there is a special final machine state qreject, so that T (Σ) halts
with qreject for
Σ /∈ I ⊂ Strings,
where I is some set of all valid, that is T -permissible input strings. We do not ask that for Σ ∈ I
∗T (Σ) halts. If ∗T (Σ) does halt then we shall say that Σ is acceptable. It will be convenient to forget
qreject and instead write
T : I → O,
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where I ⊂ Strings is understood as the subset of all T -permissible strings, or just input set and O
is the set output strings or output set, keeping all other data implicit. The specific interpretation
should be clear in context.
All of our input, output sets are understood to be subsets of Strings under some encoding. For
example if the input set is Strings2, we may encode it as a subset of Strings via encoding of the type:
“this string Σ encodes an element of Strings2 its components are Σ1 and Σ2.” In particular the sets
of integers N,Z will under some encoding correspond to subsets of Strings. However it will be often
convenient to refer to input, output sets abstractly without explicit reference to encoding subsets of
Strings. (Indeed this is how computer languages work.)
Remark 1.5. The above elaborations mostly just have to do with minor set theoretic issues. For
example we will want to work with some “sets” T of Turing machines, with some abstract sets of
inputs and outputs. These “sets” T will truly be sets if implicitly all these abstract sets of inputs and
outputs are implicitly encoded as subsets of Strings.
Definition 1.6. We say that a Turing machine T computes a function f : I → J , if I is contained in
the set of permissible inputs of T and ∗T (Σ)→ f(Σ), whenever f(Σ) is defined, for Σ ∈ I.
Given Turing machines
M1 : I → O,M2 : J → P,
we may naturally compose them to get a Turing machine M2 ◦M1 : C → P , for C = M−11 (O ∩ J),
(O ∩ J is understood as intersection of subsets of Strings). C can be empty in which case this is a
machine which rejects all input. Let us not elaborate further as this should be clear, we will use this
later on.
1.1. Join of Turing machines. Our Turing machine of Definition 1.1 is a multi-tape enhancement
of a more basic notion of a Turing machine with a single tape, but we need to iterate this further.
We replace a single tape by tapes T 1, . . . , Tn in parallel, which we denote by (T 1 . . . Tn) and call
this n-tape. The head H on the n-tape has components Hi pointing on the corresponding tape T i.
When moving a head we move all of its components separately. A string of symbols on (T 1 . . . Tn) is
an n-string, formally just an element Σ ∈ Stringsn, with i’th component of Σ specifying a string of
symbols on T i. The blank symbol b is the symbol (b1, . . . , bn) with bi blank symbols of T i.
Given Turing machines M1,M2 we can construct what we call a join M1 ? M2, which is roughly a
Turing machine where we alternate the operations ofM1,M2. In what follows symbols with superscript
1, 2 denote the corresponding objects of M1, respectively M2, cf. Definition 1.1.
M1 ? M2 has three (2)-tapes:
(T 1i T
2
i ), (T
1
c T
2
c ), (T
1
o T
2
o ),
three heads Hi,Hc,Ho which have component heads H
j
i ,H
j
c ,H
j
o , j = 1, 2. It has machine states:
QM1?M2 = Q
1 ×Q2 × Z2,
with initial state (q10 , q
2
0 , 0) and final states:
FM1?M2 = F
1 ×Q2 × {1} unionsqQ1 × F 2 × {0}.
Then given machine state q = (q1, q2, 0) and the symbols (σ1i σ
2
i ), (σ
1
cσ
2
c ), (σ
1
oσ
2
o) to which the heads
Hi,Hc,Ho are currently pointing, we first check instructions in I1 for q1, σ1i , σ
1
c , σ
1
o , and given those
instructions as step 1 execute:
(1) Replace symbols σ1c , σ
1
o to which the head components H
1
c ,H
1
o point (or leave them in place,
the second components are unchanged).
(2) Move each head component H1i ,H
1
c ,H
1
o left, right, or leave it in place, (independently). (The
second component of the head is unchanged.)
(3) Change the first component of q to another or keep it. (The second component is unchanged.)
The third component of q changed to 1.
Then likewise given machine state q = (q1, q2, 1), we check instructions in I2 for q2, σ2i , σ
2
c , σ
2
o and
given those instructions as step 2 execute:
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(1) Replace symbols σ2c , σ
2
o to which the head components H
2
c ,H
2
o point (or leave them in place,
the first components are unchanged).
(2) Move each head component H2i ,H
2
c ,H
2
o left, right, or leave it in place.
(3) Change the second component of q to another or keep it, (first component is unchanged) and
change the last component to 0.
Thus formally the above 2-step procedure is two consecutive executed instruction sets in M1 ?M2. Or
in other words it is two terms of the computation sequence.
1.1.1. Input. The input for M1 ? M2 is a 2-string or in other words pair (Σ1,Σ2), with Σ1 an input
string for M1, and Σ2 an input string for M2.
1.1.2. Output. The output for
∗M1 ? M2(Σ1,Σ2)
is defined as follows. If this computation halts then the 2-tape (T 1o T
2
o ) contains a 2-string, bounded
by b symbols, with T 1o component Σ
1
o and T
2
o component Σ
2
o. Then the output M1 ? M2(Σ1,Σ2) is
defined to be Σ1o if the final state is of the form (qf , q, 1) for qf final, or Σ
2
o if the final state is of the
form (q, qf , 0), for qf likewise final. Thus for us the output is a 1-string on one of the tapes.
1.2. Universality. It will be convenient to refer to the universal Turing machine U . This is a Turing
machine already appearing in Turing’s [1], that accepts as input a pair (T,Σ) for T an encoding of a
Turing machine and Σ input to this T . It can be partially characterized by the property that for every
Turing machine T and Σ input for T we have:
∗T (Σ) is equivalent to ∗ U(T,Σ).
1.3. Notation. In what follows Z is the set of all integers and N non-negative integers. We will often
specify a Turing machine simply by specifying a function
T : I → O,
with the full data of the underlying Turing machine being implicitly specified, in a way that should be
clear from context.
When we intend to suppress dependence of a variable V on some parameter p we often write
V = V (p), this equality is then an equality of notation not of mathematical objects.
2. Setup for the proof of Theorem 0.1
Definition 2.1. A machine will be a synonym for a partially defined function A : I → O, with I,O
abstract sets with a prescribed encoding as subsets of Strings, (cf. Preliminaries).
M will denote the set of machines. Given a Turing machine T : I → O, we have an associated
machine T by forgetting all structure except the structure of a partially defined function. T will denote
the set of machines, which in addition have the structure of a Turing machine.
2.1. Diagonalization machines. As we are going to directly construct a certain Turing machine
analogue of a Gödel statement, to make it exceptionally simple we will need to formulate some specific
properties for our machines that will require a bit of setup.
We denote by TZ ⊂ T the subset of Turing machines, with input set of X ∈ TZ of the form
SX × N, understood as a subset of Strings0 := Strings × N and with output set of X being Z. Let
O ⊂ TZ × Strings consist of (X,Σ) ∈ TZ × Strings with Σ ∈ SX , defined as above. And set
O′ := O × N ⊂ TZ × Strings0.
Define M0 to be the set of machines M whose input set is I = T × N and whose output set is
TZ × Strings.
Let
D1 : Z unionsq {∞} → Z,
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be a fixed Turing machine which satisfies
D1(x) = x+ 1 if x ∈ Z ⊂ Z unionsq {∞}(2.2)
D1(∞) = 1.(2.3)
Here {∞} is the one point set containing the symbol∞, which is just a particular distinguished symbol,
also implicitly encoded as an element of Strings. In what follows we sometimes understand D1 as an
element of TZ, denoting the Turing machine:
(2.4) (x,m) 7→ D1(x),
for all (x,m) ∈ (Z unionsq {∞})× N.
We need one more Turing machine. Let
Definition 2.5. We say that a Turing machine
R : O′ ⊂ TZ × Strings0 → Z unionsq {∞},
has property G if the following is satisfied:
• R halts on the entire O′, that is O′ is the set of R-acceptable strings.
• R(X,Σ) 6=∞ =⇒ R(X,Σ) = X(Σ), for Σ ∈ Strings0 and X ∈ TZ.
• ∀m : R(D1,∞,m) 6=∞, and so ∀m : R(D1,∞,m) = 1, by previous property.
Lemma 2.6. There is a Turing machine R satisfying property G.
Proof. LetWn be some Turing machineWn : {∅} → {∞}, for ∅ the empty string. So as a function it is
not very interesting since the input and output sets are singletons. We ask that the length of ∗Wn(∅)
is n > 0, (cf. Preliminaries).
For
(X,Σ) ∈ O′
set
Rn(X,Σ) =Wn ? U(∅, (X,Σ)),
in the language of the join operation described in Section 1, for U the universal Turing machine.
Clearly Rn halts on the entire O′, and satisfies
Rn(X,Σ) 6=∞ =⇒ Rn(X,Σ) = X(Σ).
As a function Z unionsq {∞} → Z, D1 is completely determined but it could have various implementations
as a Turing machine, so that the length lm of ∗D1(∞,m) depends on this implementation. Clearly we
may assume that ∀m : l = lm for some l, by definition of D1 as an element of TZ, as in (2.4). We then
ask that n > l is fixed. Then by construction we get:
∀m : Rn(D1,∞,m) = D1(∞,m) = 1.
Thus R := Rn has property G. 
We set T0 ⊂ M0 to be the subset corresponding to Turing machines, and we set I0 := T0 × N.
Given M ∈M0 and M ′ ∈ T0 let ΘM,M ′ be the statement:
M is computed by M ′.(2.7)
For each M ∈M0, we define a machine:
M˜ : I → TZ × Strings0
(2.8) M˜(B,m) = (M(B,m),m),
which is naturally a Turing machine when M is a Turing machine.
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Definition 2.9. For M ∈ M0, M ′ ∈ T0, an abstract element (X,Σ1) ∈ TZ × Strings is said to have
property C = C(M,M ′) if:
ΘM,M ′ =⇒ ∀m :
(
(X(Σ1,m) = D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′(M ′,m)) ∨ (∗M ′(M ′,m) does not halt) ∨ (M ′(M ′,m) /∈ O)
)
,
for M˜ ′ determined by M ′ as in (2.8).
To be more formal when we write ∗M ′(M ′,m) we should write ∗M ′(ΣM ′ ,m) for ΣM ′ the string
encoding of the Turing machine M ′. But we conflate the notation for the Turing machine and its
string specification.
Definition 2.10. We say that M ∈ M0 is C-sound if for each (M ′,m) ∈ I0, with M(M ′,m) =
(X,Σ1) defined, (X,Σ1) has property C(M,M ′). We say that M is C-sound on M ′ if the list
{M(M ′,m)}m has only elements with property C(M,M ′).
ThusM ∈M0 is C-sound iff it prints strings with property C, which expresses a certain “diagonal”
property with respect to the input. By “diagonal” we mean that this setup has something analogous
to Cantor’s diagonalization argument, but we will not elaborate.
Define a C-sound M ′ ∈ T0 analogously.
Definition 2.11. If M,M ′ as above are C-sound we will say that sound(M), sound(M ′) hold. If M
is C-sound on M ′ we say that sound(M,M ′) holds.
Example 1. A trivially C-sound machine M is one for which
M(M ′,m) = (D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′,M ′)
for every (M ′,m) ∈ I0. As the condition:
∀m :
(
(X(Σ1,m) = D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′(M ′,m)) ∨ (∗M ′(M ′,m) does not halt) ∨ (M ′(M ′,m) /∈ O)
)
,
is automatically satisfied for all M ′ ∈ T0, if (X,Σ1) = (D1 ◦ R ◦ M˜ ′,M ′). In general, for any M,M ′
the list of all strings {(X,Σ1)} with property C(M,M ′) is always infinite, as by this example there
is at least one such string (D1 ◦ R ◦ M˜ ′,M ′), which can then be modified to produce infinitely many
such strings.
Theorem 2.12. If sound(M,M ′) ∧ΘM,M ′ then
∀m :M(M ′,m) 6= (D1,∞).
On the other hand, if sound(M,M ′) then the string
G := (D1,∞) ∈ O
has property C(M,M ′). In particular if sound(M) then G has property C(M,M ′) for all M ′.
So given any C-sound M ∈ M0 there is a certain string G with property C(M,M ′) for all M ′, s.t.
for each M ′ if ΘM,M ′ then
G 6=M(M ′,m)
for all m. This “Gödel string” G is what we are going to use further on. What makes G particularly
suitable for our application, is that it is independent of the particulars of M , all that is needed is
M∈M0 and is C-sound. So G is in a sense universal.
Question 2. It would be interesting to understand what is the analogue of such universal Gödel strings
for formal systems in logic. In other words is there a notion of universal Gödel statements? This would
have to do with certain collections of formal systems with a certain property, (perhaps generalizing
our C-sound property).
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Proof. Suppose not and let M ′0 be such that ΘM,M ′0 ∧ sound(M,M ′0) and such that
(2.13) M(M ′0,m0) = G for some m0.
Set T = (M ′0,m0). Since sound(M,M
′
0), since ΘM,M ′0 , and since ∗M ′0(T )→ G ∈ O since M(T ) = G is
defined, we have that:
1 = D1(∞,m0) = D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′0(T ) = D1 ◦R(D1,∞,m0) by the conditions just above,
= 2 by property G of R and by (2.2).
So we obtain a contradiction.
We now verify the second part of the theorem. Given M ′ ∈ T0, we show that:
(2.14) ∀m :
(
sound(M,M ′) ∧ (M ′(T ) ∈ O) ∧ΘM,M ′ =⇒ R(M˜ ′(T )) =∞
)
,
where T = (M ′,m). Suppose otherwise that for some m0 and T0 = (M ′,m0) we have:
(2.15) sound(M,M ′) ∧ (∗M ′(T0) halts) ∧ (M ′(T0) ∈ O) ∧ΘM,M ′ ∧ (R(M˜ ′(T0)) 6=∞).
Then since M ′(T0) = (X,Σ1), for some (X,Σ1) ∈ O and since R is everywhere defined:
R(M˜ ′(T0)) = R(X,Σ1,m0) = X(Σ1,m0) = x ∈ Z, for some x,
by Property G of R and by R(M˜ ′(T0)) 6=∞.
Then we get:
x = X(Σ1,m0) = D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′(T0) = D1(x) = x+ 1
by sound(M,M ′), ΘM,M ′ and by (2.2), so we get a contradiction and (2.14) follows. Our conclusion
readily follows.

3. A system with a human subject S as a machine in M0
Let S be in an isolated environment, in communication with an experimenter/operator E that as
input passes to S elements of I = T × N. Here isolated environment means primarily that no
information i.e. stimulus, that is not explicitly controlled by E and that is usable by S, passes to S
while he is in this environment. For practical purposes S has in his environment a general purpose
digital computer with arbitrarily, as necessary, expendable memory, (in other words a universal Turing
machine).
We suppose that upon receiving any T ∈ I, as a string in his computer, after possibly using his
computer in some way, S instructs his computer to print after some indeterminate time an element
S(T ) ∈ TZ × Strings
We are not actually assuming that S(T ) is defined on every T , (although this would be a safe assump-
tion) only that if defined S(T ) ∈ TZ × Strings. So S also denotes a machine in our language, or a
partially defined function.
Definition 3.1. We say that S the human subject is computable if the corresponding machine S
above is computable.
3.1. Additional conditions. We now consider a more specific S0 of the type above, which addition-
ally behaves in the following way. For any fixed B ∈ T0
{S0(B,m)}m
is the complete list of strings that S0 asserts to have property C(S0, B). Of course we don’t actually
need S0 to list infinitely many strings, we only need that S0 can list as many strings as we like, and
that given any particular B, eventually any particular string that S0 asserts to have property C(S0, B)
will appear. Also as in the Penrose argument we ask that S0 asserts that he is fundamentally sound.
Our human subjects are assumed to be idealized, so that all the “brain noise” issues are stripped out of
them. In other words for our idealized humans fundamental soundness and soundness conditions are
10 YASHA SAVELYEV
equivalent. We suppose then that S0 asserts his soundness, which entails in this case that he asserts
sound(S0) for S0 the above machine.
4. Proof of Theorem 0.1
Theorem 4.1.
S0 is computable =⇒ ¬sound(S0).
That is if our subject S0 is computable he cannot be fundamentally sound. In fact we prove more, for
any S′ ∈ T0:
ΘS0,S′ =⇒ ¬sound(S0, S′).
This formalizes Theorem 0.1.
Proof. Suppose ΘS0,S′ for some S
′ ∈ T0. Suppose in addition sound(S0, S′). Then by Theorem 2.12
S0(S
′,m) 6= (D1,∞)
for any m. On the other hand S0 asserts sound(S0) and hence must assert that (D1,∞) has property
C(S0, S
′), by the second half of Theorem 2.12. In particular the string (D1,∞) must be in the list
{S0(S′,m)}m, since this list is meant to be complete. So we have reached a contradiction. 
4.1. Formal system interpretation. This is not necessary for our main theorem, but in practice
it might be helpful to interpret the above in terms of formal systems. For simplicity we will base
everything of standard set theory ST . Turing machines are assumed to be naturally formalized in ST .
Definition 4.2. We will say that S, the machine as above, is captured by a formal system F ⊃ ST
if whenever S(S′,m) = (X,Σ) then it is provable in F that (X,Σ) has property C(S, S′). Note that F
is not uniquely determined by this condition.
Let Con(S) denote the meta-statement:
∃F : (F ⊃ ST ) ∧ (F captures S) ∧ (F is consistent).
In what follows by “provably” we mean provably in ST .
Theorem 4.3. Let S0 be as above then:
(∃S′ ∈ T0 so that provably ΘS0,S′) =⇒ ¬Con(S0),
or in more logic symbols,
(∃S′ ∈ T0 : ST ` ΘS0,S′) =⇒ ¬Con(S0).
Note that “provably ΘS0,S′” does not mean that S0 can prove ΘS0,S′ in the practical sense. It just
means that after the terms S0, S′ in the statement ΘS0,S′ have been completely interpreted in set theory
ST , ΘS0,S′ is provable in ST . But interpretation of the term S0 may not even be practically attainable
by S0, as S0 is underlaid by some very complex physical system. And even if this interpretation was
attainable, S0 may not be clever enough to find the proof of ΘS0,S′ , again in the practical sense.
Proof. Let F(S0) capture S0 as above. If ΘS0,S′ then by the second part of Theorem 4.1, the following
statement L = L(S0, S′) holds:
∃m : (S0(S′,m) is defined) ∧ (S0(S′,m) does not have property C(S0, S′)).
So if provably ΘS0,S′ , L is provable in ST and hence in F(S0). On the other hand, by assumption
that S0 is captured by F(S0), ¬L is provable in F(S0). Then the conclusion follows. 
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5. Concluding remarks
The soundness hypothesis deserves additional further study, beyond what we can do here, and
beyond what already appears in the work of Penrose, and others. Here is however one final remark. If
our given human S0 is provably computed by a specific Turing machine, then by the pair of theorems
above S0 is fundamentally inconsistent. Then given sufficient advances in neuroscience and computer
science, we should be able to discover inconsistencies of such humans by brute force computer analysis
of the underlying formal systems. We can then lead S0 to assert in absolute faith that 0 = 1. Moreover,
in the context of our “thought experiment” above, we can make this brute force analysis more explicit.
For by Theorem 4.3 if provably ΘS0,S′ then {S0(S′,m)}m = TZ × Strings, since if S0 is inconsistent
(in the sense of theorem) he must assert that every element of TZ × Strings has property C. In
particular, for some m0 S′(S′,m0) evidently (and provably) will not have property C, then by the
proof of Theorem 4.3 we immediately find a contradiction in the corresponding formal system. As
an example, one such non-sense string is (D1 ◦ R ◦ S˜′ + 1, S′), evidently it will not have property
C(S0, S
′) for all S′. So we can ask a super computer to search for such non-sense strings in the list
{S′(S′,m)}m, they must eventually appear.
In the above we assume not just computability but provable computability by a particular Turing
machine. This extra assumption is unnecessary if our modified version of the Penrose argument,
given in the introduction, is accepted. In that argument we conclude inconsistency solely based on
computability. The downside of that argument is the possibly contentious issue of constructability of
a certain Gödel statement, whereas in the above everything is totally explicit.
Acknowledgements. Dennis Sullivan, David Chalmers, and Bernardo Ameneyro Rodriguez for com-
ments and helpful discussions.
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